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VIRTUE AND ANIMAL ETHICS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY 
STUDY 
 
ALISON K. OLIVER, UNIVERSITY OF SAN DIEGO 
MENTOR: CHRISTOPHER CARTER 
 
Abstract 
Analysis of important components from the sciences, philosophy, and 
theology makes apparent that nonhuman animals require moral consideration 
beyond what they typically receive in Western culture. Humans are in the habit of 
inaccurately justifying harmful treatment of animals without any proper evaluation 
of ethical behavior; the current standards of morality regarding nonhuman species 
are insufficient. For instance, in the context of the latest scientific advancements in 
animal behavior and cognition, many aspects of the partition between human and 
animal intelligence have become ambiguous; however, the typical human mindset 
stubbornly maintains the notion that humans are ultimately superior, and the 
perceived lack of intellect of nonhuman animals (a premise that has yet to be 
empirically defined) is still employed as reason enough for humans to dominate 
these other species. Furthermore, Christian scripture emphasizes the importance of 
peace and consideration while simultaneously denouncing violence and 
viciousness; thus, a Christian theology premised on love, justice, and care for “the 
least of these” (Matthew 25:40) is in favor of an ethical reevaluation rather than the 
continuation of current animal maltreatment. Upon the examination of virtue across 
multiple significant fields, it is clear that a principle moral norm is ignored once 
extended beyond human interactions, that unwarranted cruelty is wrong. 
Nonetheless, the current standards of animal treatment are highly characteristic of 
unwarranted cruelty; humans have exploited the presence of nonhuman species to 
a point that is definitively unethical. 
While we all, as a civilization, still have an incredible amount of work to do 
before we reach an ideal of human equality, many will not rest until their needs are 
met. However, there are those that are entirely unable to have a voice and oppose 
their oppressors. These beings share our world, our basic needs, and our unique 
abilities of perception and subjective experience yet do not share what we have 
defined as human rights. Animals, or more accurately, nonhuman animals, are not 
treated with the same moral consideration as are humans. While this reality is 




thought of as fact rather than ethical dilemma, few have confronted animal ethics 
with the same severity as standard “ethics”—which involves moral behavior and 
interactions between humans and only humans. As Western civilization continues 
to address the marginalized and to move toward a goal of ethical treatment among 
humans, ignoring other species in this consideration should no longer be the 
customary practice for those who strive for virtue. The human use of nonhuman 
species has distorted necessity into the installation of exploitative industries that 
disregard those species’ status as living creatures and minimizes the gravity of 
unnecessary violence. The way our society has evolved requires new reflection on 
moral norms, which should include paying attention to the nonhuman members of 
our communities. 
Many would argue that there is no place for theology or philosophy within 
the sciences, or vice versa, yet I consider these to agree in many aspects—and this 
is where truth lies. I will demonstrate how the fundamental traditions from religion 
and philosophical thought supplement new scientific findings in a complicated yet 
enlightening way, which I will apply to my analysis of morality as it pertains to 
nonhuman and human interactions. 
The remainder of this paper will address how humans are in the habit of 
inaccurately justifying harmful treatment of animals without proper evaluation of 
ethical behavior, and how the current standards of morality regarding nonhuman 
species are insufficient. I will assess various beliefs and stances on morality and 
will discuss how and why these notions should be applied to all sentient creatures. 
Because human well-being does not rely on harmful, exploitative oppression of 
nonhuman animals, cruel treatment of nonhuman animals is unwarranted and must 
be modified. By extending the implications of virtue to all sentient beings rather 
than restricting them to interpersonal interactions, we can discover how an ethical 
relationship can be established between nonhuman and human animals. With this 
interdisciplinary analysis of virtuous thought, I will argue that nonhuman animals 
require moral consideration beyond what they typically receive, and I will explore 
how ethics can and should be extended to nonhuman animals. 
Understanding Morality 
What first must be asked is, Should ethics be applied to the treatment of 
species other than our own, and if so, how? Humans do have an instinctive tendency 
to first take care of themselves before anyone else, and although this may be natural, 
it is often taken to an extent that is unarguably immoral. As those in power face 
ethical dilemmas, they do not first ask, What would be the virtuous choice? but 




rather, How does this benefit me? Rather than striving to love their neighbors or do 
the most good possible in any given situation, people desire outcomes that allow 
them to gain individual profits regardless of how the outcomes may affect others, 
especially when the others are not in direct sight. 
This phenomenon is especially prominent in terms of animal ethics. 
Institutionalized animal violence prevails largely because it is out of sight and thus 
out of mind. For example, in his Animal Liberation, well-known Australian 
philosopher Peter Singer has compiled an extensive list of extremely destructive 
experiments performed on animals.1 Although many people may know that 
research is conducted using animals in the sciences, we are incredibly unaware of 
the extents to which researchers go to keep the public from noticing what occurs 
behind closed laboratory doors. Singer explains, “It is not surprising that the public 
still has not the remotest idea of the extent of animal experimentation. Research 
facilities are usually designed so that the public sees little of the live animals that 
go in, or the dead ones that come out. (A standard textbook on the use of animals 
in experimentation advises laboratories to install an incinerator, since the sight of 
dozens of bodies of dead animals left out as ordinary refuse ‘will certainly not 
enhance the esteem with which the research center or school is held by the 
public’).”2 Likewise, other institutions, such as the food and entertainment 
industries, expend effort to conceal the violence that is characteristic of the 
institutions—as well as the degree of that violence. The unwarranted cruelty that 
ensues is of a different magnitude than the cruelty that is already expected. For 
instance, in the book Animal Factories, Jim Mason and J. A. Keller have published 
images of what animals endure in the food industry.3 Although we know pigs, 
cattle, and chickens all die to be processed as food, does the public know that 
pregnant sows are confined until they give birth and are then immobilized until 
their piglets are weaned? That live chickens are carried upside-down by their feet 
on their way to be slaughtered? Countless appalling videos can be found with a 
simple Google search that shows the unabashed handling of animals before they 
are killed for food—for example, calves being dangerously flung into much-too-
small trailers for transport to a different location. 
As media becomes more available through multiple platforms, hiding such 
inhumane treatment is becoming more difficult; however, many refuse to 
acknowledge the cruelty that is so apparent—people would rather remain in the 
 
1 Singer, Animal Liberation. 
2 Singer, Animal Liberation. 
3 Mason and Singer, Animal Factories. 




dark than accept that the animal they are eating underwent horrific suffering from 
the moment it was born to the moment it was killed. It is unethical to consciously 
deny what we all can see, and additionally unethical for institutions to deliberately 
conceal their practices. 
Christianity and Human Responsibility 
A significant theme in the Bible is the request to be gentle and to avoid 
violence; copious verses warn of the evils that violence generates, in addition to 
verses that acclaim gentleness.4 Although these verses may be focused on 
interpersonal interactions, this theme is not restricted purely to humans. Christians 
are called to love and respect God’s creation—the entire earth—as we have a 
responsibility on this planet to do. Even though the Bible makes strong distinctions 
between the flesh of humankind and the flesh of other creatures, we are nonetheless 
asked to rule responsibly over the earth and its inhabitants. Importantly, this is 
where many fail to recognize the definitive discrepancy between having 
“dominion” (Genesis 1:28) and the exploitative domination of the earth and its 
nonhuman beings. In fact, when taken into context, God’s grant of human dominion 
over all else is actually a mandate for humans to care for and value all that God 
created, all that God declared as “good” (Genesis 1:25). 
Importantly, many Christians refer to the numerous Bible passages that 
discuss meat eating in order to defend this practice: if God specifically expressed 
that animals were to be used for food, how could this be unethical? For instance, 
Genesis 9:3 conveys God’s declaration that “every moving thing that lives shall be 
food for you. And as I gave you the green plants, I give you everything.” From such 
passages, I acknowledge that God made man to be omnivorous and that certain 
species may have been created for the purpose of food. Many other factors to 
consider are constantly overlooked, however! First is the question of necessity. In 
biblical times, humankind obviously had significantly less access to basic 
necessities such as food and clothing, and the use of animals in these aspects thus 
greatly contributed to human flourishing, yet current technologies and capacities 
allow this use to be nonessential, so should such permission by God still be used to 
defend the killing of animals today? More notably, we must recognize the extent to 
which we have taken God’s consent to use animals for human benefit. Would God 
 
4 Against violence, for example: 1 Peter 3:9, 1 Timothy 3:3, Genesis 4:7, Hosea 4:2, Proverbs 
3:31, Psalm 11:5, Titus 3:2, Mark 7:21–22, Matthew 5:38–39, Genesis 9:5–6, Matthew 26:52–54. 
Commending gentleness: Philippians 4:5, Colossians 3:12, Proverbs 15:1, Galatians 5:22–23, 
Leviticus 19:17–18, Galatians 6:10, Zechariah 7:9–10. 




appreciate the violent murder of various species in the name of fashion and vanity? 
Would God approve of the shocking viciousness of animal maltreatment in the food 
industry? 
Christians have taken biblical passages to defend unethical behavior, 
manipulating the text to support certain their own agendas. For instance, the 
discussions of slaves and masters in the Bible was commonly construed as an 
approval from God that slavery is a righteous institution. Animosity toward those 
who diverge from Christian convention, such as homosexuals, individuals of other 
faiths or customs, or merely Christian people of color, has been and continues to be 
observed. Historically, White Christian males asserted themselves to be the 
undisputed authority over other races, women, nonhuman animals, and the earth—
over all of God’s creation. Illustrated by European colonialism, enslavement of 
African Americans, and established sexist ideals, it is clear that those who 
considered themselves to be the most concerned with biblical thought in the past 
were also the most oppressive. 
The rhetoric employed to describe Native and African Americans was often 
characteristic of dehumanization; nonwhite individuals were depicted and 
perceived as “savages” and “animals.” This sentiment exposes the juxtaposition 
that because other races were viewed as animalistic, White males were the 
unmistakable definition of “human”; thus, notions of humanity are built upon a 
foundation of oppression, discrimination, and fallacious interpretations of 
superiority. Syl Ko addresses the connection between animality and racism in 
Aphro-ism:  
As authors of the racial framework, Western white men conceived of 
themselves as the representatives of humanity. They were the objects of morality 
and law, and, not coincidentally, the subjects that dictated how we should think 
about notions such as morality, law, and justice. Their notion of “the animal”—
construed under their white supremacist framework as “subhuman,” “nonhuman,” 
or “inhuman”—is the conceptual vehicle for justified violence. ... Since racism 
requires this notion of animality, since racism and race-thinking would fail to make 
sense without animality, those of us interested in resisting or combatting racism 
need to take seriously why the status of “the animal” is what it is.5  
Importantly, these White Christian males did not recognize how such 
oppression opposed the major teachings of their own religion; Jesus’s radically 
compassionate teachings and actions disregarded any apparent inequalities between 
 
5 Ko and Ko, Aphro-ism. 




the people with whom he interacted. As Jesus expressed, “For even the Son of Man 
did not come to be served, but to serve, and to give his life as a ransom for many” 
(Mark 10:45), and as Paul the Apostle later emphasized, “There is neither Jew nor 
Greek, there is neither slave nor free, there is no male and female, for you are all 
one in Christ Jesus” (Galatians 3:28). Jesus and his followers taught of the necessity 
of “love, joy, peace, patience, kindness, goodness, [and] faithfulness” (Galatians 
5:22), yet the historically powerful individuals have chosen their power over the 
practice of these teachings. To recognize every person as equal in Christ would be 
a forfeit of status and power; therefore, artificial and unjustified hierarchies 
persevered, and still remain. 
Nonetheless, the concept that is consistently emphasized throughout 
Christian tradition and scripture is love, which is directly referred to as the most 
important virtue to exercise. Despite this seemingly obvious element of 
Christianity, many have turned away from this virtuous way of thinking and 
behaving, and have used the Bible (among other resources) to assert certain claims 
that directly oppose the greatest commandments: “Love the Lord your God with all 
your heart and with all your soul and with all your mind. This is the first and greatest 
commandment. And the second is like it: Love your neighbor as yourself. All the 
Law and the Prophets hang on these two commandments” (Matthew 22:37–40). An 
emphasis should therefore be placed on love and gentleness rather than on 
engineering scripture to promote harmful notions of exploitation and 
objectification. 
Furthermore, it is important to note that many of the prominent figures of 
the scientific revolution (e.g., Hooke, Boyle, Bacon, Faraday, Copernicus, Kepler, 
Galileo, Pascal, Newton, Mendel) and the contemporary philosophy period (e.g., 
Rousseau, Locke, Descartes, Kant) considered themselves to be Christian. Their 
findings and teachings remain incredibly influential, as much of modern science 
and philosophy is rooted in these White Christian males’ revelations. Consequently, 
certain views of moral responsibility, superiority, and humanity itself originated 
purely from the privileged members of society. In contrast, Jesus gave special 
attention to the poor and the marginalized, as he himself was one of the 
marginalized—a poor Palestinian Jew living under Roman occupation, with no 
political power beyond that of social influence. In many instances, he denounced 
the evils of oppression and viciousness, and was the exemplar of virtue: “The Spirit 
of the Lord is upon me, because he has anointed me to proclaim good news to the 
poor. He has sent me to proclaim liberty to the captives and recovering of sight to 
the blind, to set at liberty those who are oppressed” (Luke 4:18). 




In his The Spirit of Soul Food, author, pastor, and theology professor 
Christopher Carter evaluates Jesus’s teachings in the context of the exploitation of 
human and nonhuman animals, and reveals the importance of considering all 
species, for those who identify as Christian as well as those interested in ethical 
behavior and equality between genders and ethnicities.6 He explains:  
Our relationship with nonhuman animals should be influenced by Jesus’ 
teaching that those who are the peacemakers will be blessed (Matthew 5:9) 
and his refusal to use violence to prevent his arrest (Luke 22:49–51). In the 
last example, Jesus shows us that human beings should not harm other living 
beings. Harming another being or ending another living being’s life when it 
is unnecessary for our survival allows the logic that justifies an oppressive 
hierarchal relationship between one group over another to persist. In this 
way, the killing of nonhuman animals in general and specifically the killing 
of nonhuman animals for food perpetuate the logic of oppression that has 
justified the exploitation of non-white human beings, women, the GLBTQ 
community, and the environment. Thus, if we desire to eliminate oppressive 
hierarchal relationships, imitating Christ means that our plates and bowls 
should look drastically different than they may typically do.  
As such, the defending of nonhuman animal exploitation on the basis of our 
“humanity,” or our “superior” hierarchical status promotes the same reasoning 
implicated in oppressive and exploitative human relationships—a major source of 
evil and viciousness in past and current Western societies. 
Accordingly, although the Bible discusses killing nonhuman animals for the 
purpose of food or sacrifice, there is no biblical defense for the infliction of 
suffering and cruelty unnecessarily. As we are created in God’s image, humanity’s 
greater status than that of other creatures does not discount those creatures’ innate 
value and goodness, and we have a duty to respect all of God’s creation. The 
presence of evil in this world was brought about by human misjudgment, and 
animals are subject to these evils just as we are—even though they are generally 
helpless against human-inflicted violence. The Bible stresses the importance of 
peace and consideration while simultaneously denouncing violence and 
viciousness; thus, I contend that a Christian theology premised on love, justice, and 
care for “the least of these” (Matthew 25:40–45) is in favor of an ethical 
reevaluation rather than the continuation of animal maltreatment. 
 
6 Carter, Spirit of Soul Food. 





Anthropocentrism is defined as the notion that humankind is the central or 
most important element of existence, particularly in comparison to other species or 
entities.7 This is a philosophical thought that often refers to an excessive elevation 
of human importance and is not typically incorporated into basic human rationale. 
Nevertheless, most, if not all, people unquestionably rank humanity as the ultimate 
superior being. This reasoning has been left unexamined, largely because it seems 
to be factual, yet in order to avoid assumptions, we must ask what criteria are used 
to determine human superiority. I observe that the essential measurement is 
manifested in human intelligence but also implicates our physical form, religious 
ideologies, emotional and insightful abilities, and many other distinguishing 
qualities that are thought to be restricted to humans. Even though copious research 
has been conducted to juxtapose humans and animals, the founding thought has 
remained that humans are smarter and more rational than, and therefore superior to, 
all other species. Before discussing the ethical concerns of assuming that 
intelligence corresponds to supremacy, I will first address comparative research 
that attempts to create a division between human and nonhuman animals. 
The study of animal cognition, or the study of the mental capacities of 
nonhuman animals, is a significant field in the behavioral sciences. Interestingly, 
this study falls under a category of psychology called comparative psychology. 
This indicates that research of animal intelligence is fundamentally conducted 
through comparison—hierarchizing the mental abilities of nonhuman animals 
against those of human animals—which includes a significant problem found in the 
origin of comparative psychology. C. Lloyd Morgan was a 19th-century British 
ethologist and psychologist known for constructing an experimental approach for 
the study of animal cognition that prevails today: Morgan’s Canon. In his An 
Introduction to Comparative Psychology,  Morgan states, “In no case is an animal 
activity to be interpreted in terms of higher psychological processes if it can be 
fairly interpreted in terms of processes which stand lower in the scale of 
psychological evolution and development.” 8 Basically, always assume there is a 
primitive explanation for an animal’s behavior; anthropomorphizing animal 
cognition will yield false conclusions. This basis of studying animal intelligence 
generates preceding biases that are left unaccounted for. If researchers begin with 
the expectation that higher intellectual processes are exhibited only by humans and 
 
7 Boslaugh, “Anthropocentrism.” 
8 Morgan, Comparative Psychology. 




that their results must align with Morgan’s Canon, how can they conduct fair tests? 
Even though the technology currently used to test brain activity (in any species) has 
drastically advanced, we still lack a method that can identify what animals are truly 
thinking. We cannot empirically discern process (mental functioning) and 
performance (what is observed externally) in an experimental setting. To this end, 
our knowledge of animal intelligence, feelings, cognition, consciousness, and the 
like is lacking, rendering such defenses of ultimate human superiority irrelevant. 
Furthermore, the concrete neurological and cognitive differences between 
humans and other animals are questionable. The brain-to-body size ratio is 
noticeably larger in humans than in other species, and neuroscientists have 
uncovered many other factors that contribute to the uniqueness of human 
intelligence and cognition. For example, humans have approximately 11.5 billion 
more cortical neurons than do most other mammals, meaning that regardless of 
brain size, the human brain exhibits the most neuronal density of any species. 
Furthermore, the myelination of nerve cells in humans is much thicker than that in 
other animals. Myelin sheaths allow for electric impulses to be sent quickly along 
axons in the brain; thus, the speed at which information travels through the brain is 
significantly faster for humans than for other species. Although numerous qualities 
demonstrated by the human brain set it apart from other species, such qualities are 
not entirely exclusive to humans. All primates, for instance, exhibit similar-
diameter myelin sheaths, and whales and elephants have only about half a billion 
fewer cortical neurons than do humans, which is numerically close enough to 
discount any resulting critical cognitive differences. Furthermore, brain size has 
been found to be an inappropriate measure of overall intelligence, in that certain 
small-brained species, such as birds and rodents, display more cognitive complexity 
than do larger-brained species, such as horses and cows. Ultimately, qualities of the 
human brain that appear to suggest human uniqueness and intellectual superiority 
may be additionally found in other species or may be altogether obsolete. 
Other intellectual capabilities that humans possess are often incorrectly 
assumed to be restricted to humans. For example, humans are not the only species 
capable of forming social relationships, exercising complex problem-solving skills, 
and finding and using external tools. New animal-behavior research has uncovered 
that some cognitive skills are more advanced in other species than in humans, 
including certain memory abilities, adaptability, and flexible learning strategies. 
Researchers have conducted many cognitive tests in which animals outperform 
their human counterparts, so why do we remain certain of our complete intellectual 




supremacy over animals? As Ursula Dicke and Gerard Roth of Scientific American 
state in the article “Animal Intelligence and the Evolution of the Human Mind”: 
As far as we know, no dog can compose music, no dolphin can speak in 
rhymes, and no parrot can solve equations with two unknowns. Only 
humans can perform such intellectual feats, presumably because we are 
smarter than all other animal species—at least by our own definition of 
intelligence. … The lack of an obvious structural correlate to human 
intellect jibes with the idea that our intelligence may not be wholly unique: 
studies are revealing that chimps, among various other species, possess a 
diversity of humanlike social and cognitive skills.9 
As our knowledge of neuroscience advances, many aspects of a seemingly definite 
line between human and animal intelligence continue to become blurred. 
Importantly, intelligence continues to serve as the major measurement for 
one’s ranking within a dominance hierarchy, defined in animal behavior as “a form 
of animal social structure in which a linear or nearly linear ranking exists, with each 
animal dominant over those below it and submissive to those above it in the 
hierarchy.”10 This phenomenon is not restricted to nonhuman animal behavior but 
is also an innate factor of sociability. Philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s 
revolutionary work Discourse on the Origin and Basis of Inequality Among Men 
acknowledges that social living introduces artificial inequalities.11  He addresses a 
form of self-love that is unnatural and hierarchical: amour-propre. This essentially 
refers to one’s desire to be “better” than others, the desire to be ranked higher in 
the established social order. As a result, inequalities are developed concerning 
whom can be used to what purpose and how valuable their contribution is in the 
wider community. Rousseau explains, “Here are all natural qualities set in action, 
every man’s rank and fate set, not only as to the amount of their goods and the 
power to help or to hurt, but also as to mind, beauty, strength or skill, as to merit or 
talents, and, since these are the only qualities that could attract consideration, one 
soon had to have or to affect them; for one’s own advantage one had to seem other 
than one in fact was.” Because of the inflation of comparative thinking that arises 
from sociability, Rousseau recognizes man in society as an unfree being that only 
finds meaning in this relational self-love, amour-propre. 
 
9 Dicke and Roth, “Animal Intelligence.” 
10 Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica, “Dominance Hierarchy.” 
11 Rousseau and Gourevitch, Discourses. 




We must acknowledge the consequences of the inclination to hierarchize on 
the basis of intelligence. Today, the theory of prominent philosopher Aristotle 
regarding “natural slaves,” or individuals born lacking certain intellectual qualities, 
is widely discredited. In Book I of his Politics, Aristotle argues, “For he is a slave 
by nature who is capable of belonging to another—which is also why he belongs to 
another—and who participates in reason only to the extent of perceiving it, but does 
not have it.”12 Furthermore, Thomas Aquinas held a similar view, as stated in his 
Summa Contra Gentiles:  “For men of outstanding intelligence naturally take 
command, while those who are less intelligent but of more robust physique, seem 
intended by nature to act as servants.”13  
To be sure, it was not uncommon for past figures to defend the institution 
of slavery with the argument that “natural slaves” are revealed through certain 
intellectual weaknesses and that such weaknesses can be compensated for by their 
submission to other, smarter, people. This argument was not restricted to Aristotle’s 
and Aquinas’s generations and has been utilized by more recent figures. American 
psychologist and author Arthur Jensen, who taught at the University of California, 
Berkeley, and died in 2012, conducted numerous studies regarding racial 
differences in intelligence. In his book The g Factor: The Science of Mental Ability, 
Jensen discusses variability in the g factor, or the general intelligence factor, among 
White and African American individuals: “The relationship of the g factor to a 
number of biological variables and its relationship to the size of the white-black 
differences on various cognitive tests (i.e., Spearman’s hypothesis) suggests that 
the average white-black difference in g has a biological component. ... Racial 
populations differ in many genetic characteristics, some of which, such as brain 
size, have behavioral and psychometric correlates, particularly g.”14 Jensen 
published numerous works claiming that some races are inherently more intelligent 
than others, which have been determined to be malicious and incorrect. Indeed, the 
general academic population recognizes comparable oppressive works to be 
condemnable, yet intelligence (along with wealth and other artificial values that 
result from intelligence) still evidently determines the worth of both human and 
nonhuman animals alike. 
Although we can clearly note the ethical violations present in such works 
and mentalities, using scientific studies pertaining to intelligence to advocate for 
the ranking of worth among species remains incredibly prevalent. Peter Singer 
 
12 Clayton, “Aristotle: Politics.”  
13 Aquinas, Contra Gentiles. 
14 Jensen, The g Factor. 




articulates this correlation in his Animal Liberation: “ ‘Speciesism,’ by analogy 
with racism, must also be condemned. … If possessing a higher degree of 
intelligence does not entitle one human to use another for his or her own ends, how 
can it entitle humans to exploit nonhumans for the same purpose?” Regardless of 
humanity’s accepted higher degree of intelligence, intellect does not correspond to 
freedom or amount of moral consideration due. Furthermore, in reference to 
scientific fact, we know that animals have the abilities to be scared, to feel pain, 
and to protect their kin. In other words, humans are aware that animals are capable 
of feeling and thus of suffering. 
It is important to note Jeremy Bentham’s acknowledgment of such reality:  
The French have already discovered that the blackness of the skin is no 
reason why a human being should be abandoned without redress to the 
caprice of a tormentor. It may one day come to be recognized that the 
number of the legs, the villosity of the skin, or the termination of the os 
sacrum are reasons equally insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to 
the same fate. What else is it that should trace the insuperable line? Is it the 
faculty of reason, or perhaps the faculty of discourse? But a full-grown 
horse or dog is beyond comparison a more rational, as well as a more 
conversable animal, than an infant of a day or a week or even a month, old. 
But suppose they were otherwise, what would it avail? The question is not, 
Can they reason? nor Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?”15 
The ethical weight of a being’s capacity for suffering is much greater than the 
weight of a being’s level of intelligence, yet we still employ nonhuman animals’ 
lack of intelligence (a premise that has yet to be empirically defined) as reason 
enough to harmfully exploit other species. 
Human Morality 
This paper serves as a confrontation of the negligible moral norms applied 
to nonhuman animals. While there is no complete, explicit definition of morality, 
the most agreed-upon theories from philosophers throughout history have 
emphasized that vicious, harmful, unnecessarily cruel acts are unethical. Such acts 
can be measured by the degree or amount of suffering they produce, and, as 
articulated by C. S. Lewis in his anti-vivisection argument, “whenever pain is 
inflicted it requires justification.”16 (Importantly, vivisection is defined as “the 
 
15 Bentham and Mill, The Utilitarians. 
16 Lewis and Walmsley, C.S. Lewis Essay Collection. 




cutting of or operation on a living animal usually for physiological or pathological 
investigation” or, broadly, “animal experimentation especially if considered to 
cause distress to the subject.”17) Accordingly, there is a difference between quickly 
killing livestock for the purpose of food—the death can happen in an instant and 
the suffering is quickly over—and the inhumane treatment of animals from the 
moment they are born to the moment they are relieved of the harsh, agonizing lives 
they have been subject to by the hand of “moral” agents. 
In addition to intelligence, morality itself has been referred to as yet another 
element of humanity that separates us from other animals. Presumably, humans are 
the only beings who are aware of morality and are moral agents—defined as people 
capable of distinguishing right from wrong, or morally responsible or blameworthy, 
for behaving immorally.18 Immanuel Kant developed Kantian ethics, in which 
moral agents have a duty to act in accordance with moral law. Specifically, he 
writes, “An action done from duty has its moral worth, not in the purpose to be 
attained by it, but in the maxim according with which it is decided upon; it depends 
therefore, not on the realization of the object of action, but solely on the principle 
of volition in accordance with which, irrespective of all objects of the faculty of 
desire, the action has been performed.”19 Furthermore, Kant contends that moral 
agents must be rational, autonomous beings: “The will is conceived as a faculty of 
determining oneself to action in accordance with the conception of certain laws. 
And such a faculty can be found only in rational beings.”20 Notwithstanding our 
total uncertainty regarding whether nonhuman animals (or even human animals, for 
that matter) have free will, virtue ethics predominately concludes that humans have 
a certain moral responsibility to choose to do what is virtuous and to refuse the 
adverse, immoral choice. As Aristotle conveys in The Nicomachean Ethics, “Virtue 
lies in our power, and similarly so does vice; because where it is in our power to 
act, it is also in our power not to act.”21 To this end, do we, as moral agents, choose 
to behave ethically in our treatment of animals? Likewise, do we exercise our 
autonomous abilities and knowledge of morality to refuse unethical treatment of 
animals? As Peter Singer identifies:  
We rarely stop to consider that the animal who kills with the least reason to 
do so is the human animal. We think of lions and wolves as savage because 
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they kill; but they must kill, or starve. Humans kill other animals for sport, 
to satisfy their curiosity, to beautify their bodies, and to please their palates. 
Human beings also kill members of their own species for greed or power. 
Moreover, human beings are not content with mere killing. Throughout 
history they have shown a tendency to torment and torture both their fellow 
human beings and their fellow animals before putting them to death. No 
other animal shows much interest in doing this.22  
Sadly, the moral implications of human treatment of nonhuman animals are 
consistently avoided; many would rather ignore these truths than consider ethical 
treatment of animals. 
In terms of human morality, there is a common psychological disconnect in 
which we perceive our overall character to be good, regardless of our individual 
actions. Few people evaluate their sins or unethical behavior and decide, “I often 
behave immorally, so I must be a bad person.” I believe this disconnect to be a 
consequence of guilt, which is defined in psychology as “a self-conscious emotion 
characterized by a painful appraisal of having done (or thought) something that is 
wrong and often by a readiness to take action designed to undo or mitigate this 
wrong”23; however, likely because animals cannot outwardly express their pain and 
suffering in the same way humans can, the dimension of guilt that encompasses 
wanting to “undo or mitigate this wrong” is not experienced in the majority of 
humans. Interestingly, it is important to consider whether, if animals acquired the 
ability to speak, we would still treat them as we do. Is the fact that animals cannot 
directly exclaim, “I am in pain!” the determining factor that supports the 
continuation of human-inflicted violence? Although verbal language is a critical 
feature of human uniqueness, we know that animals experience pain as we do; in 
fact, much of what we know regarding the somatosensory responses to painful 
stimulation was obtained from (painful) research conducted on animals! Because 
guilt is an uncomfortable feeling, and because animals cannot demand their own 
liberation as humans can, their unprovoked suffering therefore remains acceptable. 
Likewise, when animal ethics is addressed, opposition is a typical response. 
For instance, Peter Singer’s Animal Liberation, a significant resource in the 
deliberation of animal ethics, received widespread objection after its publication. 
Animal ethics, in itself, is rarely considered as a valid discipline by those in power, 
at the top of the socially constructed dominance hierarchy, those historically 
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oppressive individuals. Arguments against the moral consideration of animals are 
manifested in animals’ assumed irrationality, lack of moral perspective, and lack of 
free will. For example, philosophy professor Tibor Machan contends in his work 
Putting Humans First: Why We Are Nature’s Favorite:  
So far, there is no clear evidence that any species other than human beings 
reside at the top of the natural hierarchy. When human beings emerge in the 
natural world, so does the capacity to think and exercise self-initiative. That 
is why Aristotle calls us ‘the rational animal’. … Animals, furthermore, 
have no central, crucial need of thinking, whereas human beings cannot 
begin to survive without thinking. And unlike animals, human beings 
cannot count on instincts to guide them automatically. For those lower 
animals that do exhibit some rudimentary cognitive capacity, it is very much 
a side issue, elicited usually by human beings in highly circumscribed and 
unusual circumstances (such as laboratories).24 
As such, critics of animal ethics habitually establish their reasoning in humanity’s 
superiority: because we exhibit rationality, morality, and autonomy, we are to be 
ethically considered as distinct from nonhuman animals. 
Conversely, the assertion that human beings are the only beings that exhibit 
rationality is not factual, as we do not have evidence that confirms nonhuman 
animals to be definitively irrational. Moreover, by characterizing the human species 
as rational, we dismiss the entirely irrational behaviors and attitudes that humans 
exhibit. In an interview with the American Psychological Association’s Kirsten 
Weir, psychologist and behavioral economist Dan Ariely discussed human 
irrationality and dishonesty, explaining, “Classical economics assumes human 
beings behave rationally. But if you believe everyone is rational, and you look at 
humanity and see how much misery there is in the world, then you have to conclude 
that this is the best we can do ... the world isn’t like this as an outcome of the 
decisions of eight billion rational people. It’s like this as the outcome of eight billion 
irrational people.”25 Arguably, humans are the only species that knowingly and 
unnecessarily harm themselves and others without true reason. 
Furthermore, in acknowledgment of the significant vices of the human 
species, we must note the driving forces of many of our actions: greed, gluttony, 
arrogance, and apathy. In Environmental Virtue Ethics, Philip Cafaro speaks of 
these vices and of how humanity’s submission to these vices opposes reason and 
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actually harms the entire planet. In reference to traditional philosophical thought, 
Cafaro writes,  
The tradition sees vice as contradicting and eventually undermining reason, 
hence destroying our ability to understand our proper place in the world and 
act morally. Aristotle expresses this in his distinction between incontinence 
(the tendency to pursue pleasure even when we know it is wrong to do so) 
and the full-blown vice of intemperance (where the continued pursuit of 
illicit pleasure has so clouded our judgement that we no longer recognize 
right from wrong). The vices are habits of thought and action. Left 
unchecked, they tend to cloud reason, the voice of both conscience and 
prudence.26  
Regarding humanity’s continual destruction of the planet, he later exposes our 
refusal to accept that in harming the planet, we are likewise harming ourselves: 
“We falsely assume that we can keep separate harms to nature and harms to 
humanity, harms to others and harms to ourselves. We do not see that 
environmental vices do not just harm nature; they harm us and the people around 
us.” Driven by greed and selfishness, those in power often succumb to vices and 
irrational behaviors that directly cause universal damage: harm to our planet, to 
nonhuman animals, and to humanity. In claiming that humans are the only rational, 
moral creatures, we also must admit that we are irrational and immoral, as our 
knowledge of virtue requires our immoral actions to be the choice to act immorally 
rather than virtuously. The aspiration for improvement within our species must be 
accompanied by a conscious decision to choose virtue over vice; otherwise, our 
immoral presence on the earth will continue to cause destruction. 
Virtuous Treatment of Nonhuman Animals 
Again, I contend that sentient beings do require moral consideration beyond 
what they are currently given. No number of discrepancies that permit the human 
species to govern the rest of the world’s inhabitants can excuse the institutionalized 
abuse of nonhuman—but still thinking, feeling, valuable—beings. In fact, these 
very discrepancies bestow on us the moral responsibility to consider improvements, 
to strive for virtue in the treatment of all beings. 
Indeed, certain consequences occur when virtuous thought is applied to the 
treatment of nonhuman animals. Practices that have become traditions are 
threatened, and an overall human mentality is put into question. Nonetheless, the 
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progressions of Western culture have historically yielded beneficial outcomes, and 
an acceptance of ethical treatment of animals should be viewed as another triumph 
over oppressive attitudes. Similar to the abolitionist movement or the feminist 
movement, animal liberation shares an end of challenging oppression, 
objectification, and exploitation. Moreover, we must acknowledge what is actually 
at stake in the moral consideration of other beings. Are the majority unwilling to 
sacrifice their ability to eat animal meat? Will scientific research be hindered by the 
moral consideration of animals? Does animal ethics minimize the value of 
humanity? No, the application of moral norms to nonhuman species does not 
require the use of nonhuman species to be entirely eliminated and does not imply 
that they are equal to humans. Instead, in terms of nonhuman and human animal 
relations, we should be asking, How can we reshape our current standards of animal 
treatment virtuously? When and how is the exploitation of animals justified? What 
constitutes ethical treatment? Rather than being viewed as a threat to human 
flourishing, it should be perceived as another way in which we each can exercise 
virtue. 
Virtue ethics encompasses a purpose of cultivating virtuous habits in order 
to identify how one can grow and become a better person. Ethicists emphasize that 
consistency is an essential component of morality; one’s ethical reasoning must be 
reliable in all of one’s decision-making. When one alters one’s ethics case by case, 
one is not practicing virtue but instead allowing oneself to behave in any way that 
is of direct benefit to oneself. As emphasized by Kant’s categorical imperative “act 
only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should 
become a universal law,”27 sinful acts, even those that appear to be harmless, are 
nonetheless sinful. By this reasoning, purchasing animal meat is an action that 
supports the institutionalized cruel treatment of animals, and while it may be an 
indirect method of support that appears to be harmless, consumers of animal meat 
are the direct cause of animal slaughter. In practice, discern where and how the 
“meat” you buy lived; was it factory-farmed or truly pasture-raised? Are your eggs 
actually free-range, or do they merely adhere to the weak standards set by the 
USDA? If vegetarianism or veganism is not a practical lifestyle for monetary, 
dietary, or other personal restrictions, spending a few extra dollars and minutes of 
research to practice more-ethical meat consumption can be a great contribution 
toward fostering virtuous treatment of nonhuman animals. The cascade of events 
that follows consumer habits works fast, and even individual practices slowly but 
surely will alter the destructive principles of the Western food industry. In 
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conclusion, individuals who strive to take moral actions must employ their ethics 
consistently and must consider the ways in which their actions harm nonhuman 
beings in addition to human beings. 
Conclusion 
In consideration of the recent breakthroughs in such areas as modern 
science, technology, and communications, the Western mindset commonly reasons 
that the current status of humankind is superior to that of past generations. There is 
an unrecognized yet prevalent bias toward modern times that increases alongside 
such advancements, especially within the younger generations of people. Many 
traditions of the past are becoming outdated, and younger individuals are frequently 
drawn to breaking the old status quo in favor of, hopefully, progressive outlooks 
and acceptance. 
I recognize the importance of an ethical reflection in terms of our 
relationship with other species. Do we want to be the generation of people that puts 
an end to the unnecessary human-inflicted animal violence? Or do we want this 
singular aspect of modern life to remain unchanged and unevaluated from a moral 
perspective? 
I suggest that we use virtue ethics to discern appropriate treatment of 
animals because certain institutionalized evils are completely unnecessary yet are 
customary because the vast majority of people do not directly experience this 
violence. In biblical times, people had a different relationship with the animals they 
killed for food, clothing, and sacrifice. They raised their own flocks and killed them 
with their own hands, and this was done under God’s instructions (“you may 
slaughter animals from the herds and flocks the Lord has given you, as I have 
commanded you” [Deuteronomy 12:21]), in the kosher way that involves using a 
knife to sever the trachea and esophagus—the quickest and most painless method, 
in which the animal does not endure much suffering at the time of its death.28 Now, 
however, animals intended to be meat suffer their entire lives and are not known to 
their consumers as living beings but are always and exclusively considered meat. 
Even though many would argue that they disagree with the institutionalized 
mistreatment of animals, they are under the illusion that change is not within their 
power. People therefore continue to purchase what is at their fingertips—an already 
dead animal that they cannot do anything to save. Of course, true change will not 
happen instantaneously, but the importance of determination for a greater purpose 
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is essential for humanity’s moral growth. Martin Luther King Jr. acknowledged this 
in a speech at New York University in 1961: “Human progress is neither automatic 
nor inevitable. ... Every step toward the goal of justice requires sacrifice, suffering, 
and struggle; the tireless exertions and passionate concern of dedicated 
individuals.”29 Clearly, his cause for justice and equality among human individuals 
requires much more sacrifice, suffering, and struggle than a new consideration of 
ethical animal treatment will require. 
Humans’ demonstrable superiority in our capacity to affect the conditions 
in our world does not imply a superiority in the intrinsic value of human lives. That 
we exhibit certain uniqueness in our intellectual capabilities does not grant us 
clearance to discount other lives as insignificant. The infliction of suffering on the 
basis of superiority is not an ethically sound notion but is a submission to 
oppressive ideals that have historically plagued our civilization. Western societies 
do not rely on the exploitation of animals to flourish, and thus, the unjustified 
violence that ensues is entirely immoral. We are the cause of animals’ suffering, 
but to what end? What benefits do we achieve that outweigh the degree of suffering 
that animals are subject to? 
Because the current intentions of animal killing are fixed in profit rather 
than necessity, however, and because the majority of humans have disconnected 
themselves from the consequences of this violence, practices characteristic of 
unwarranted cruelty to nonhuman animals continues and the immoral practices are 
not widely opposed. Those who have directly resisted the unethical treatment of 
animals are not given sufficient attention, because most people would rather avoid 
this reality than admit that major customs, and their own behaviors, are wrong. 
Biblical defenses of animal killing have become significantly obsolete in 
industrialized countries, yet the central principles of Christian theology—love, 
justice, compassion, gentleness—are as necessary to embrace as ever. It is essential 
to make an effort in cultivating habits that produce virtue rather than evil in this 
time when each action affects so many others around us, both human and 
nonhuman. We must seek to end the alienation of animals in our culture, in order 
to resist the vices that such alienation continues to generate. 
The maltreatment of animals perpetuates the same logic that was, and still 
is, used to justify the mistreatment of human beings—which is unmistakable in the 
factory farming industry. Significantly, the employees of these establishments are 
typically people of color and are typically treated as less than human. Charlie 
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LeDuff reports on these inhumane occurrences in his New York Times article “At a 
Slaughterhouse, Some Things Never Die.”30 LeDuff conveys the terrible working 
conditions that the immigrant, marginalized, and desperate workers undergo; as one 
worker is quoted as saying, “This job’s for an ass. They treat you like an animal.” 
The factory farming industry outwardly seeks out those in need; it prevails in its 
violence by pursuing those who feel stuck in marginalized positions. LeDuff 
explains that in the slaughterhouse, “the turnover is 100 percent. Five thousand quit 
and five thousand are hired every year. You hear people say, They don’t kill pigs 
in the plant, they kill people. So desperate is the company for workers, its recruiters 
comb the streets of New York’s immigrant communities, personnel staff members 
say, and word of mouth has reached Mexico and beyond. The company even 
procures criminals. Several at the morning orientation were inmates on work 
release in green uniforms, bused in from the county prison.” Clearly, this institution 
as a whole not only propagates violence toward animals but also engages in the 
dehumanization and inhumane treatment of human beings. In contemplating our 
civilization’s capacity for virtue, we must acknowledge that this major industry is 
an immoral industry. 
Furthermore, the routine acts of violence in the agriculture industry not only 
include immoral treatment of the animals but are also psychologically damaging to 
the associated employees. James McWilliams, history professor and author of Just 
Food: Where Locavores Get It Wrong and How We Can Truly Eat Responsibly, 
writes about this phenomenon in his article “The Dangerous Psychology of Factory 
Farming.”31  He evaluates the current practice of killing animals for food in 
comparison to how this practice was conducted in the past: “Before 1850, when 
most animal husbandry happened on a relatively small scale, farmers viewed their 
animals as animals. That is, they saw them as sentient beings with unique needs 
that, left unaddressed, would result in an inferior product.” The post-1850 mindset 
that emphasizes profitability above all else in the animal agriculture system 
dismisses the acknowledgment of the animals as animals, viewing them instead as 
lucrative objects. Of this, McWilliams reports,  
Beginning with plants, and then moving to animals, they became less 
concerned with individual idiosyncrasies and more concerned with 
collective evaluations of productivity. The chain of production expanded, 
and, as it did, farmers came to speak in terms of nutrient input, breeding 
schedules, confinement space, and disease management. By the 1870s, 
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farmers were regularly referring to their animals not as animals but, literally, 
as machines being built in factories. … [Factory farming’s] impersonal, 
highly rationalized structure is designed to protect those involved from the 
emotional consequences of killing.32 
Because of the objectification of animals in the agriculture industry, farmers 
do not have to face the reality of animal slaughter but can train their minds to 
recognize living beings as objects, machines, and revenues. This notion alone 
reveals the extent to which humans avoid ethical treatment of animals. That factory 
famers knowingly have to objectify and demoralize the animals they slaughter in 
order to preserve their own mental well-being exposes that this industry promotes 
the cultivation of evil rather than virtue, disregarding both the factory farmers 
themselves and the animals they work with. 
In accordance with theological and philosophical thought, the ethical 
treatment of animals must entail practicing consistently distinguished virtues. In 
particular, Plato and Aristotle emphasized prudence, courage, temperance, and 
justice as the four cardinal virtues. Rousseau identified pity, or compassion, as the 
essence of human morality. Jeremy Bentham taught of the weighing of pains 
against pleasures, and Kant explained how to exercise goodwill in his categorical 
imperative. Among these past philosophers, as among many other virtue ethicists, 
the concept of morality is defined in multiple ways, yet none of these methods of 
exercising virtue is sufficiently applied to the treatment of animals. Furthermore, 
Christian ethics maintains that Jesus is the embodiment of righteousness and is the 
ultimate role model for humanity, and that love, joy, peace, patience, kindness, 
goodness, faithfulness, gentleness, and self-control are fundamental characteristics. 
As Philippians 4:8–9 states, “Whatever is true, whatever is honorable, whatever is 
just, whatever is pure, whatever is lovely, whatever is commendable, if there is any 
excellence, if there is anything worthy of praise, think about these things.” It is not 
difficult to see that our consideration of nonhuman animals does not align with any 
of these virtues or methods of practicing virtue. We must therefore reflect upon our 
moral obligations to nonhuman beings and discontinue the institutionalized, 
unjustified animal violence that hinders our society’s capacity for virtue. 
Virtuous behavior toward nonhuman animals would entail a complete 
reconsideration and elimination of the unwarranted institutionalized cruelty and 
violence involved in the exploitation of other species. In refusing the oppression of 
animals, we are refusing this major vice that has historically harmed the human 
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members of our communities, just as it continues to harm the nonhuman members. 
Those who care about exercising virtue or imitating Christ in their lives should 
confront the immorality that accompanies the exploitative oppression of animals 
and should subsequently consider changing their diets to reflect their priorities. 
Because virtue is an action, we must be active in our practice and recognition of 
virtue—active in our moral consideration of both human and nonhuman beings. 
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